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RECENT CASES
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-ACcEPTANCE OF SUm LEsS THAN DEBr.-FRYE
V. HUBBELL, ET AL., 68 Am. (N. H.) 325.-Held, that the payment and accept-
Ance of a sum less than the amount due in full satisfaction and discharge of a
debt is a defense to the collection of the balance. Chase, J., dissenting.
Hardly any other court has directly overthrown the long-established rule
that acceptance of a lesser sum is no accord and satisfaction of a debt. Fire
Ins. Assoc. v. Wickham, 141 U. S. 564; Allison v. Abendroth, io8 N. Y. 470.
However, this rule has been regarded as so technical and unreasonable that
recent cases seek to avoid it by extraordinary exceptions. Thus, the con-
servative view that the mere giving of a receipt does not affect the rule,
Walan 'v. Kerby, 99 Mass. i; Ryan v. Ward, 48 N. Y. 204, is rejected in two
States. Ahorn v. Rathbone, 54 Conn. 444; Ashley v. Hendee, 56 Vt. 209.
Again, the payment of a smaller sum for a judgment debt is not good,
Fletcher v. Wurgin, 97 Ind. 223; but an exception has been made where the
debtor thus gives up his right to appeal and borrows the money in order to
pay. Clay v. Hoysradt, 8 Kan. 74. An insolvent's part payment has been
sustained, where he sold exempt property to get the money. Ward, Murray
& Co. v. Young, 89 S. W. (Tex.) 456. That the creditor requested his debtor
to borrow the money is usually immaterial, Albrecht v. Johnson, 2 N. Y. City
Ct. 350; but where the money was borrowed from a fund which would not
oherwise have been obtainable, part payment was held good. Dalrymple v.
Craig, 149 Mo. 345. See COMMENT in last issue.
CARRIERS-CARRIAGE OF GOODs-FREIGHT RATEs.-HARRIS V. GREAT NORTH-
ERN Ry. CO., 93 PAC. 908 (WAsH.).-Where two freight rates are provided
by a carrier, one in contemplation of the ordinary carrier's liability, and the
other a less rate by reason of a limitation of that liability, and goods are
delivered to it for shipment in the ordinary manner, without any agreement
relative to any limitation of liability or reduction in freight charges, held,
that the carrier assumes the ordinary liability of a carrier, and the law will
imply that the usual rate is the one which was intended. Fullerton, Mount,
and Rudkin, JJ., dissenting.
A common carrier is usually an insurer against all injuries to the goods
shipped, except those caused by the act of God or the public enemies. Red-
field on Carriers, Section 24. But this liability of the carrier may be limited
by special contract, provided the carrier remain responsible for his own or
his servants' negligence. Camp v. Hartford, etc., Steamship Co., 43 Conn.
333. In England, before the passage of 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, such a contract
limiting the carrier's liability was held to be formed if the carrier by general
publication had brought home notice to the shipper that his liability was
limited. Riley v. Home, 5 Bing. 217; London & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Durham,
18 C. B. 826. And this rule has been given considerable weight in Maine
and Pennsylvania, vid., Sager v. Railroad, 31 Me. 228; and Pa. Central R.
Co. v. Schwarzerberger, 45 Pa. St. 2o8. But the prevailing rule in the United
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States is that positive assent by the shipper, and a definite consideration mov-
ing from the carrier are necessary for the formation of any contract limiting
a carrier's liability. Paddock z. Railroad, 6o Mo. App. 328; Blossom v.
Dodd, 43 N. Y. 264.
CAmmls-REGurAmor OF STATIOw GROUDs-DscRImATIoN AS TO
HAcKmEN.-UNoN DEPoT & Ry. Co. v. MEEKING, zT Ai., 94 PAc. 16 (Cot.).-
Held, that a railroad or depot company owning a strip of land at a passen-
ger station for the accommodation of travelers on railroads may lawfully
exclude some hackmen or carriers of baggage from using it as a hack stand
for the purpose of plying their vocation; they being allowed free access to
deliver outgoing and receive incoming passengers.
It is a settled rule that a common carrier has, by virtue of its right of
ownership in its property, the control of its depots, subject only to the rights
of the public having business relations with it. Kates v. Atlanta Baggage &
Cab Co., io7 Ga. 636; Godbout v. St. Paul Union Depot, 79 Minn. i88. In
determining these rights of the public the conflict begins. Until quite recently
the principle of the majority of cases has been that since the railroad acquired
its grounds by the right of eminent domain, it could not grant special
privileges that the State could not; Indianapolis Union R. Co. v. Dohm, 153
Ind. io, and thus establish monopolies and enhance prices. New England
Express Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 57 Me. i88. The strongly dissenting
opinion in Old Colony R. Co. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35, goes so far as to claim
that such discrimination leads to the control of passengers and merchandise
beyond the carrier's own line. The principle of many modem decisons is
that such exclusive privilege does not violate a reasonable preference by any
common carrier to any persons, since this privilege does not apply to common
carriers in respect to their services as carriers. Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Old
Dominion Baggage Transfer Co., 99 Va. iix; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. v.
Scovill, 71 Conn. 136. It is thus an extension of the same principle laid down
in the Express Cases, 117 A. S. x, and recently applied so as to allow only
one man to solicit orders for the sale of lunches in a depot Fluker v.
Georgia R. & Bkg. Co., 8i Ga. 461.
CoNsPiAcY-INJuRY To BusINEss-PARTicuLRm Acrs.-WILsoN V. HEY,
83 N. B. 928 (ILi ).-Held, that the giving of notices by members of a union
to third persons to excite their fear or reasonable apprehension that their busi-
ness will be injured unless they break off business relations or cease patron-
izing the plaintiff are unlawful, and, if the notices given and the things
done have the natural effect of exciting such reasonable fear and apprehen-
sion and accomplish the result intended, it is immaterial that they are not
accompanied by direct threats. Scott and Farmer, JJ., dissenting.
It is the well established right of every dealer and tradesman to carry
on his business in an open market, and to have all other business men left
free to trade with him or not as they personally see fit. Transportation Co.
v. Standard Oil Co., 5o W. Va. 6iz; Booth v. Burgess, 65 Atl. 226 (N. J.).
But since the enjoyment of rights by one person is often hampered by
another's lawful exercise of a similar right, the merchant in his enjoyment
of his right to an open market may suffer injury without having been
wronged. For example, if workmen combine and simply withdraw their
own patronage from one in order to persuade him to yield to their demands,
though they may injure his business, they do him no wrong, since they are
simply exercising their own right to choose their patrons. Boutwell v. Marr,
7S Vt x. And this same principle applies when merchants combine to control
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a business, and by lawful competition injure the trade of another. Mont-
gomery, Word & Co. v. S. Dakota, etc., Ass'n., i5o Fed. 413. But it cannot
be said that labor unions have a right to intimate to a third party that they
will withdraw their trade from him in the future and persuade others to do
the same unless he stops dealing with another; and therefore this inter-
ference with a person's right to an open market amounts to a legal wrong,
even though it be effected by means both peaceful and seemingly lawful.
Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492.
CoxnAcTs-ILLA -y-Ero aczMrz r.-SxxN v. FoURmmrNi ST.
SToRE, io8 N. Y. Supp. 83o.-Held, that a contract by which plaintiff sells
goods to defendant through its purchasing agent, the inducing cause for plac-
ing the order with the plaintiff being plaintiff's agreement, unknown to defend-
ant, to pay the agent five per cent of the purchase price of goods ordered by
him, is tainted by such agreement, so that on grounds of public policy an
action for the purchase price cannot be maintained. Scott, J., and Patter-
son, P. J., dissenting.
The better doctrine is that any such plaintiff may recover who can estab-
lish his case without referring to the illegal contract. Chitty on Contracts,
657; Armstrong v. American Exch. Nat. Bank, 133 U. S. 433. And a New
York case, analogous to the above, maintains that the mere fact that one of
the parties has violated a penal statute in the approach to the contract does
not prevent a court from enforcing payment under it. Ballin v. Hein, iox
N. Y. Supp. 38. Where both contracts were made at the same time and are
still executory, the contrary is held. Stanton v. Sturgis, zo Fed. 789. If in
the same contract the legal part is severable from the illegal, the good will
be enforced. Fishell v. Gray, 6o N. J. L. 5. So, though a contract for an
exclusive agency is illegal, the vendor may recover for his bill of goods sold
under it. Packard v. Byrd, 73 S. C. I; Annheuser-Busch Brewing Asso. v.
Houck, 27 S. W. (Tex.) 692. Arnot v. Pittston & E. Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558,
contra. The New York Court will never attempt such a separation in behalf
of a wrong-doer. Saratoga County Bank v. King, 44 N. Y. 87.
CoNxmAcrs-MurTuALITY-FuRnsHiNG MAftuALs.-LiMA LocomoTiVz
& MACH. Co. v. NAT. SMr. CASTINGS Co., 155 FFn. 7.--Held, that an agree-
ment by the defendant with the plaintiff, in a well established business, to
furnish all the plaintiff's requirements in steel castings for the remainder of
the year, at prices mentioned, is not void for want of mutuality.
This holding has the support of the more modem decisions where one
party is impliedly bound to buy all of his requirements of the other. Minn.
Mill. Co. v. Goodnow, 4o Minn. 497; Lewis v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 61 Mo.
534; McCartnet, et al., v. Glassford, I Wash. 579; Contra, Campbell v. Lam-
bert, 36 Ia. 35; Schlitz v. Komp, xx8 Ill. App. 566. Contracts for all one may
require are valid. Dailey v. Canning Co., 128 Mich. 591; Wells v. Alexander,
13o N. Y. 642; and for all one may make or produce. Herrick v. Wardwell,
58 Ohio S. R. 294; McCall v. Icks, io7 Wis. 232, contra, Lowe v. Ayer-Lord
Tie Co., 29 Ky. L. R. 1302; Thayer v. Burchard, 99 Mass. 5O8. They are
valid also in some cases where the contract depends upon a contingency.
Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wiltshire, 135 Cal. 654; Boyd v. Brown, 47 W.
Va. 238. But agreements to furnish all that one may want or order are
invalid. McCaw v. Felder, et al., UiS Ga. 4o8; Bailey v. Austrian, i9 Minn.
535; Drake v. Vorse, 52 Ia. 417.
CoNTcrs-SUEsTATI AL FPFo11ANcE-RzcovnY.-FLAGG v. Scuor-
z=w, x4z N. Y. Sunt. zoo4.-Held, that proof of a substantial performance
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o1 a UUUU ~4- utn n.. u., -o the contract price less h
value of the work omitted. MacLean, J., dissenting.
Performance by the common law rule demands a strict adherence to the
terms of the contract in order to constitute a discharge. Leonard v. Dyer, 26
Conn. 172; Glacius v. Black, So N. Y. 145. A recovery may be had in equity,
however, where there is proof of a substantial performance. Heckmann v.
Pinkey, 81 N. Y. lzi; Page v. Greeley, 75 Il. 400. The latter rule has been
adopted in the courts of law in the case of building contracts, it being laid
down that the contractor must act in good faith. Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y.
648. And the omission must be of some inconsiderable details of construc-
tion which do not enter into the substance of the contract. Bush v. Jones,
x44 Fed. 942; Fauble v. Davis, 48 Ia. 462. This is a question of fact for the
trial court. Rose v. O'Riley, iii Mass. 57; Clark v. Collier, xoo Cal. 256.
And wherever the doctrine is recognized the onus probandi is on the plaintiff.
Timmer v. Jourgensen, 144 N. Y. 65o. And the amount recoverable is the
contract price less full compensation for all defects. Gleason v. Smith, 9 Mass.
484; Katz v. Bedford, 77 Cal. 319.
CoRnRATONxs-SALE oF Svocxc-FDucARY RELATIoNSI-REsCIssIoN-
STERN v. STERN, i07 N. Y. Supp. goo.-One in a trust relationship with another
was induced by the fraudulent representations of that other to purchase
stock in a certain company. Plaintiff, the defendant's son, bought stock in
a mining and smelting company at request of his father, who, wilfully mis-
stating facts as to the prospects and manufacturing ability of the said com-
pany-saying that the company could produce 6oooo tons of pig iron yearly,
when he knew it could not-prevailed upon his son to purchase stock in
the said company.-Held, that such violation of trust relationship was fraud,
and that, together with a tender back of the stock, with a demand for con-
sideration paid, were grounds for an action on the theory of rescission.
Ingraham and Scott, J.J., dissenting.
The intentional misrepresentation of a material fact constitutes fraud.
Edelman v. Latchan, iSo Pa. 419; Stark v. Soule, 9 N. Y. St. Rep. 555;
French v. Ryan, xo4 Mich. 625. The English rule is the same. Derry v.
Peake, L. R. Cepp. Cas., 337. When parties deal in trust and confidence,
the omission of one of the parties to an agreement to make inquiries as to the
truth of the facts stated by that other, cannot be implied to him as negli-
gence, and is no defense in an action of fraud. Mead v. Bunn, 32 N. Y. 275;
Gwain v. Masterson, xb2 Ind. 157; Watson v. Brown, 113 Iowa 308; Hunt v.
Barker, 22 R. L x8. In an equitable action to rescind a contract because of
fraud, it is suffcient for the plaintiff to offer in his complaint to restore
what he has received, where he has acted promptly upon discovery of the
fraud. Rohrof v. Schutte, 154 Ind. 183.
FALSE IMPRsONMENT-PRoBABLE CAUsE--ABANWONMENT OF PROSECU-
TION.-SANDERS v. DAvis, 44 So. 979 (ALA.).-Held, that want of probable
cause for plaintiff's arrest cannot be inferred in an action for false imprison-
ment, from the failure or abandonment of the prosecution.
Although this holding of the court is the established rule in actions
for malicious prosecution, Staub v. Van Bethuysen, 36 La. Ann. 467; Cooley
on Torts, page 179; in actions for false imprisonment it is decidedly the
exception. In such cases, voluntary dismissal of proceedings on which
plaintiff was arrested, Beebe v. De Baun, 8 Ark. Sio; or his discharge from
arrest, Rosenkranz v. Hass, 20 N. Y. Supp. 88o; or his acquittal after trial
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or examination, Lezler v. Huntington, 24 La. Ann. 330; but not, however,
a nolle prosequi after disagreement of jury, Burbanks v. Lefovsky, 134 Mich.
384, is presumptive evidence of want of probable cause for his arrest, but is
not invariably fatal to justification by probable cause. Allen v. Wright, 8 C.
and P. s22; Murray v. Friensberg, i5 N. Y. Supp. 450. Even the acquittal
of the plaintiff on a criminal charge, although presumptive evidence of want
of probable cause, does not bar the defendant, in an action for false impris-
onment, from proving that said acquittal was, in fact, an error, and thus
destroying its presumptive effect. Cahill v. Fitzgibbon, 16 L. R. Qr. 371.
MASTER AND SERVANT-AcTs OF SERVANT-DIREcriON OF FOREMAN-
METHOD OF WoRX.-ANDERSON v. MU.ixEN BROS., xo8 N. Y. Surr. 61.-
Plaintiff's intestate and another were employed to put certain braces in an
elevator bin of great depth, and were directed by the foreman to use planks
placed across the braces to stand on. The foreman gave them no instruc-
tions as to how to place the planks, and did not furnish any ropes or fasten-
ings. Intestate and his companion merely laid the planks across the braces
without fastenings of any sort, and one of the planks slipped under intes-
tate and precipitated him to the bottom of the bin, causing his death. Held,
that, though intestate and his companion placed the planks, neither of them
devised such method or followed it until ordered to do so by defendant's
foreman in charge of the work, and hence defendant was responsible for
failure to provide a safe scaffold, as required by the Labor Law, Laws 1897, p.
467, c. 415, Sec. I8.
At common law the master is not liable for injuries caused by a defect-
ive scaffold erected by the servant himself. Channon v. Sanford, 7o Conn.
573; Kimmer v. Weber, 151 N. Y. 417. The Labor Laws of New York, Laws
of 19o7, p. 467, c. 415, Sec. 8, provide that "a person employing or directing
another to perform labor of any kind in the erection . . . of a house,
building, or structure, shall not furnish, or erect, or cause to be erected, for
the performance of such labor, scaffoldings . . . which are unsafe, unsuit-
able, or improper. . . " And the courts in construing this statute have
held that where proper materials were at hand, by the use of which safe and
suitable scaffolds could have been constructed, and where the dangerous
conditions were caused by the failure of the employee to use the materials
so provided, the master could not be held liable. Williams v. First Nat.
Bank, 118 App. Div. 555; Rotondo v. Smyth, 92 App. Div. 153. However,
this statute is a positive prohibition placed upon the master from which
he will not be excused because of his own negligence or the carelessness of
his servant, and extends to responsibility for the safety of the scaffold itself
and for details of its construction. Steward v. Ferguson, 164 N. Y. 553.
MASTER AND SERVANT-FELLOW SERVANTS-CAR INSPECTORS.-KILEY V.
RUTLAND R. Co., 68 AT.. 713 (VT.).-Held, that a car inspector is not a fellow
servant of the conductor of a train, but is intrusted with a duty resting on the
railroad company, which it cannot delegate so as to relieve itself from liability
for non-performance, whether the cars carried be its own or foreign cars
which the company is required by statute to receive and transport.
It is a matter of judicial disagreement whether a master can discharge
the duty of inspection and repair by selecting and employing competent per-
sons. Essex County Electric Co. v. Kelly, 57 N. J. L. ioo. A great number
of decisions, including very recent ones, hold that an inspector and con-
ductor are fellow servants. Shuster v. Philadelphia B. & W. R. Co., 62 At.
544
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689 (Del.); St. Louis, T. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Rice, 5i Ark. 467. Likewise an
inspector and a car coupler, Love v. Ohio & M. R. Co., 6 Ohio Dec. 839;
and likewise an inspector and a brakeman. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v.
Hughes, iig Pa. St. 301; Mobile & 0. R. Co. v. Thomas, 42 Ala. 672. The
present weight of authority appears to be contra, not on the principle laid
down in Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 55 I1. 492, that they are in dif-
ferent departments; but because inspection and repair is a non-delegable
duty of the master, for breach of which he is absolutely liable. Northern
P. R. Co. v. Peterson, 162 U. S. 346; Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co. v. Birk,
99 S. W. 753 (Tex.). Between these clearly defined rules, there is the doc-
trine, uncertain in its application, that a master is merely bound to supervise
inspectors and see that there is a sufficient number. Rogers v. Ludlow Mfg.
Co., 144 Mass. 2o2.
NEGLIGENcE-TREsPASSERS-PLAcES ATTRAcTIvE To CHrLDRENz.-BRowx v-
SALT LAxE Cry, 93 PAc. (UTAH) 57o.-A child was attracted into an open
conduit, which the city maintained as a necessary part of its waterworks
system. While playing there, it was drowned. Held, the city was not liable.
The general rule is that landowners are not liable for any injuries to
trespassers. 2 Thomp. Neg., Section io25. But the law has imposed an
exceptional liability upon railroads which operate turntables, on the ground
that they are especially attractive, likely to cause injury, and that they are
artificial creations of the owner. On this "turntable doctrine," there has
arisen an irreconcilable conflict, but it is undoubtedly the general rule.
Kansas C. R. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 22 Kan. 686; Edgington v. Burlington,
C. R. & N. R. Co., 1X6 Iowa, 4IO;. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v'. Simpson, 6o
Tex. To3. However, it is absolutely repudiated in the principal eastern
jurisdictions, Daniels v. N. Y. & N. E. R. Co., i54 Mass. 349; Frost v. East-
ern R. Co., 64 N. H. 220; Turess v. New York, S. & W. R. Co., 61 N. J. L.
314. And these courts likewise deny relief to trespassing children who are
injured by other machines left on the street. Fitzgerald v. Rogers, 68 N. Y.
Supp. 946. On the other hand, those States which have sanctioned the turn-
table rule have extended it to the most extreme cases, as where the owner
of a top-heavy piece of tubing was held liable to a child upon whom it fell
by the child's fault. Kopplekom v. Colorado Cement-Pipe Co., 54 L. R. A.
(Colo.) 24. But the danger of overstretching this rule is now apparent,
and the recent tendency is to limit strictly its application. Twist v. Winona
& St. P. R. Co., 39 Minn. 164. The above case is a decided exception, for
in 'a case of exactly the same fadts, a city was declared not liable for the
drowning of a child in one of its open drains. City of Rome v. Cheney, ir4
Ga. x94.
